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the real was not quite exclusively the rational. For in Hegel's view there is found always, after reason has done its best, a certain residuum of the opaque and the fortuitous. Royce makes this explanation, not as an admission that Hegel lacked the courage of his prejudice, but rather as a vindication of Hegel's sanity and common sense. But it would be interesting to learn what bearing this should have upon our final estimate of the value and function of Hegel's philosophy; and of the philosophy of Royce.

The other point to be mentioned is Royce's showing that these absolute idealists were all pragmatists—though none the less absolutists. Readers of Royce will recall the pragmatic strain introduced into his own philosophy by the refusal to separate intelligence and will. But what interests me most in this connection, though the observation ought not to be novel, is the similarity, amounting to identity, between Dewey's functional theory of consciousness and the Hegelian dialectic. For both views it seems that the function of consciousness is simply to resolve older difficulties and conflicts while creating newer ones on a higher level, and for both the distinction of subject and object is the product of this function; and the question is suggested, whether the functional theory of consciousness was a discovery of biology or of dialectic.

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Nietzsche, sa Vie et sa Pensée: Les Précurseurs de Nietzsche.

CHARLES ANDLER. Paris: Editions Bossard. 1920. Pp. 384.

The professor of German literature at the Sorbonne gives us here the first instalment of a comprehensive work on Nietzsche—the most comprehensive yet essayed. It is to be completed in five later volumes, entitled as follows: *La Jeunesse de Nietzsche (jusqu'à la rupture avec Bayreuth)*; *Nietzsche et le Pessimisme esthétique*; *Nietzsche et le Transformisme intellectuel*; *La Maturité de Nietzsche (jusqu'à sa mort)*; and *La dernière Philosophie de Nietzsche (le renouvellement de toutes les valeurs)*. Volumes II, III and IV may be expected soon—they are in press; Volumes V and VI are in active preparation. The present volume had just gone to press "at the hour of the battle of the Marne" (1914); very properly, then, it is dedicated to the memory of M. Andler's colleague, M. Robert Gauthiot, and of twenty-two of his pupils, "*germanistes Français*, who gave their lives for their country, and for the European civilization in which, as they always believed, the Germany of Goethe, Beethoven and Nietzsche must recover its place." Moreover, the Dedication gives the clue to M. Andler's standpoint, that of the Good European.

Even were M. Andler not the author, it is palpable that this would

be a work of first rate importance; M. Andler being the author, it is equally palpable that anything like competent review must await the appearance of the larger part at least of the sequel. Meanwhile, we have a fascinating foretaste.

As I had an opportunity to indicate recently, Nietzsche swept over my horizon nearly thirty-four years ago.¹ And, endeavoring to explain why I must differ from Mr. W. M. Salter's admirable monograph, I said:

"Nietzsche may veritably prove the last representative of the 'secret infinity' so characteristic of the essential spirit of romanticism—the ultimate romantic. *Ne plus ultra*. As for me, I have never been able to see him otherwise. We can not understand the continuous thunderstorm reverberating in his mind unless we have due regard to the oppugnant forces that had focus there, rendering him at once so suggestive and so puzzling, so remarkable and, no less, chuck-full of impossible dogma. His phases are no accident. Take them as basis for charges of inconsistency, and you rule yourself out of court. . . . How secondary the rôle played by the sobriety of philosophy when one views the incandescent phenomenon in this way. . . . On the other hand, we constantly recognize the accent, nay the phraseology of Tieck, Fr. Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Arndt, Kleist, Immerman and, very significantly, the mood of the Feuerbach-Wagner episode ('*das Junge Deutschland*'), now almost forgotten in our approved texts. . . . The doublets in Nietzsche are close enough to be called weird. . . . As I see it, then, we must approach Nietzsche from some such angle rather than from the objectivities of philosophy. But if so, another generation may well have to pass ere the time will be ripe."

I also drew attention to the influence of the Renaissance, especially of its ideal, *nobilità* (*Vornehmheit*), and of Emerson. Evidently, M. Andler has leaped my "generation." For he adopts substantially my point of view about the romantics; dedicates a long discussion to the influence of the Renaissance as Nietzsche felt it through his friend and colleague, Jacob Burckhardt; and, giving me good measure, closes his volume with a chapter on Emerson!

It were superfluous to record that he reveals much I had not caught, particularly about Schiller and, in a measure, about Hölderlin and Fichte. But a curious paradox discloses itself the further I read. M. Andler, a professor of literature, tends to stress the influence of the philosophical element in literature upon Nietzsche; while I, a professor of philosophy, have always tended to stress the influence of the imaginative element in literature which, to my thinking, made Nietzsche a prophet. So far, too, M. Andler traces certain metaphysical *clichés* of romanticism in Nietzsche, where I find rather the representative of the final phase of the whole romantic movement. All of which goes to show that, with a person in the Nietzsche mould, the background of the reader counts enormously.

But it is time to outline M. Andler's plan. The body of the volume consists of three books. After a Preface, dealing in general with

¹ Cf. *The Monist*, Vol. XXXI, pp. 133 f.

Nietzsche's spiritual predecessors, we have, I—*L'Heritage allemand de Nietzsche*, containing six chapters, on Goethe, Schiller, Hoelderlin, Kleist, Fichte and Schopenhauer. The greater importance of Schopenhauer is indicated by the space accorded him,—forty-two pages, compared with eighty-nine distributed over the other five. II—*L'Influence des Moralistes Français*, containing six chapters on Montaigne, Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, Fontenelle, Chamfort, and Stendhal. Pascal and, even more, Stendhal, receive the lion's share of space. III—*L'Action du Cosmopolitisme Contemporain*, with two chapters on J. Burckhardt and Emerson. I am delighted to see M. Andler emphasize Burckhardt's influence by allotting him seventy-five pages; Emerson receives thirty-one. A useful summary, brief but very much to the point, completes the book.

After a very careful reading of the whole, and several readings of parts, mainly to trace subtle affiliations, it would be as easy as it is tempting to take M. Andler's exposition point by point, and to show where it hits the mark, where it seems far-fetched. But, till further volumes are before us, this might well prove unfair, and therefore unprofitable. Let me content myself with saying that, while the various "predecessors" are in Nietzsche, there is a tendency to dwell upon select coincidences of phraseology somewhat to the exclusion of the larger movement peculiar to Romanticism. Any one can see what I mean by reference to the chapter on Emerson. Naturally enough, perhaps, M. Andler does not altogether grasp the New England genius. Then, too, a cautious consideration of the tendencies of thought in Germany and German Switzerland from 1840 till 1865, when Feuerbach dominated the situation, is a pressing *desideratum*. No doubt the missing synthesis will appear in the sequel, and we shall be delivered from overstress upon obvious romantic *clichés*.

In any case, this foretaste whets appetite, because approach has been taken from the right angle. It would be superfluous to comment upon the scholarship and equipment of the author. They fill one with envy—and expectation.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. January, 1921. *The American Journal of Psychology* (pp. 1-4): G. STANLEY HALL. — A brief account of the founding and development of the *Journal* is given. A brief statement of editorial policy by E. B. Titchener is also added. *Early Psychological Theories of Herbert*